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UNITED STATES V. CRA WFORD:'
HAS THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNNECESSARILY
"WAIVED" SUPERVISION OF PAROLEES?
2
I. INTRODUCTION
For good reason, the Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of
the recent holding by a panel ofjudges in United States v. Crawford.3
In Crawford, the panel held that police may conduct parole searches
only under individualized suspicion of continuing criminal activity,
4
producing an unnecessary limitation on searches under Fourth
Amendment 5 jurisprudence. As a result, law enforcement has been
hamstrung in its ability to supervise and investigate illegal activity by
parolees. California's previous rule that parole searches only be non-
arbitrary, non-capricious, and non-harassing has fallen in favor of a
higher standard-one that requires that officers demonstrate
reasonable, individualized suspicion before conducting a search,
1. 323 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003), reh 'ggranted.
2. The views expressed in this Comment are solely those of the author.
They do not reflect the views of Judge Trott.
3. 323 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g granted.
4. See id. at 716; see also Robert Greene, Court Limits 'Fourth Waiver'
Home Searches of Parolees, METROPOLITAN NEWS, Mar. 6, 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.metnews.com/articles/craw030603.htm; Jason Hoppin,
Circuit Puts Limits on Parole Searches, THE RECORDER, Mar. 6, 2003, at 6;
Henry Weinstein, Court Curbs Searches of Parolees' Homes: Police Must
Have Reasonable Suspicion Even Though Waivers Are a Condition of Release,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at B6.
5. The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
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even when they suspect a parolee may have been involved in
criminal activity.
6
In Crawford, the dissent properly objected to the new, elevated
standard. Noting the Supreme Court's "special needs" doctrine,7 the
dissent argued that California's need to supervise its parolees
outweighs whatever privacy expectation parolees who sign
conditions of parole allowing for searches at any time may have.
8
Accordingly, the dissent argued, the majority's holding that
individualized suspicion of ongoing criminal activity is required for
parole searches was not only unwise, but also wrong, given the
Supreme Court's interpretation of special needs.
9
The new rule announced by the majority is imprudent and
unnecessary in light of current Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.10 This Comment argues that Crawford results in an
unjustified limitation on law enforcement's ability to conduct
legitimate investigations. To do so, it discusses why the Crawford
decision was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision
in United States v. Knights" or the Court's line of special needs
6. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 711. The standard falls just short of the
probable cause necessary for ordinary citizens.
7. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
8. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 732-33 (Trott, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 736-37 (Trott, J., dissenting).
10. See Laurie L. Levenson, Recent Decisions End Trend of Limiting
Parolee Privacy Rights, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug. 25, 2003, at 7 (discussing
the most recent trend in the Supreme Court to allow for greater leeway to law
enforcement in parole searches).
11. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). The Knights Court considered whether a search
conducted pursuant to a similar California "Fourth Waiver" and supported by
reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity complied with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court concluded that a
search conducted with reasonable suspicion that the probationer was engaging
in criminal activity did not violate the Fourth Amendment and thus declined to
answer whether searches conducted pursuant to blanket "Fourth Waivers" but
not supported by reasonable suspicion are also supported by the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 122.
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cases. 12 Additionally, it argues that California's alternative to the
release and careful supervision of its parolees is to keep them in
overcrowded prisons, now the only place where law enforcement
officials may conduct adequate supervision, as California's parole
conditions have now been effectively invalidated. 13  The better
approach, consistent with current Supreme Court jurisprudence, is to
require only that the government provide a minimal showing that the
search was conducted for legitimate law enforcement purposes and
not merely to interfere with parolee privacy.
Part II of this Comment discusses the facts of Crawford and the
standards the court applied. Part III discusses the jurisprudential
lines under which Crawford was decided and argues that the
Crawford court's analysis unnecessarily departed from those lines. It
further discusses why the court's refusal to address California's
special needs plainly contradicted the very case on which the
majority relied. The concept of special needs discussed in this
Comment does not necessarily mean that parole searches may be
conducted with no cause. But certainly a lesser showing than that
required by Crawford should be sufficient to protect privacy interests
while still allowing law enforcement its legitimate authority.
Finally, this Comment discusses the balance between the
government's needs and parolee expectations and concludes that the
balance the majority achieved in Crawford was erroneous and
resulted in an unsound rule. Part IV concludes that the decision in
Crawford has deprived law enforcement of its legitimate authority to
oversee those in state custody, 14 and that a lesser standard for
searches should have been adopted.
12. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067 (Deering Supp. 2003) ("Any inmate
who is eligible for release on parole pursuant to this chapter shall agree in
writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and
with or without cause); see also Joanathan Turley, A See-No-Evil Parole
System, L.A. TimEs, May 12, 2003, at B 11. By no means is supervision within
the confines of prisons ideal, but with budget cuts in California, Turley argues,
supervision outside the prison walls is done only through "divine intervention."
Id.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3056 (Deering 1992).
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II. THE CRAWFoRD DECISION
A. Facts
1. Crawford's Criminal History
In 1989, Raphyal Crawford became a ward of the California
State Penal system.15 He had been convicted of selling cocaine base,
was released, and then was arrested for a second time for firearm
possession by a felon and for possession of marijuana for sale.
16
Again, Crawford was released from prison on parole.'
7
Before his release, Crawford signed a document, frequently
referred to as a "Fourth Waiver."' 8 In California, parolees must read
and sign such a document prior to being released on parole. 19 Among
other things, the document states that the parolee understands that he
or she is subject to search by law enforcement at any time, without a
15. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 724 (Trott, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 702. Although both law enforcement and the legal community
frequently refer to the document as a "Fourth Waiver," the dissent in Crawford
argued that this term inaccurately describes it. See id. at 724 (Trott, J.,
dissenting). In fact, all parolees are subject to the terms of the document. Id.
at 724-25 (Trott, J., dissenting). Because it is unlikely that the term accurately
describes the document, this Comment encloses the term in quotes. The
"Fourth Waiver," in relevant part states:
You and your residence and any property under your control may
be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of
Corrections or any law enforcement officer...
You agree to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace
officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search
warrant and with or without cause...
You have read or have had read to you this notification and the
following Conditions of Parole and understand them as they apply to
you.
Id. at 702, 726; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067 (Deering
Supp. 2003).
19. See Hoppin, supra note 4, at 6.
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warrant, and without cause. Crawford was then released on parole,still a ward of the state penal system.2'
2. The Parole Search
In 2000, while Crawford was on his second release from prison,
an "unnamed source" identified Crawford as an accomplice to a
robbery committed while Crawford was on his first release. 22  After
discovering that Crawford was on parole and subject to the "Fourth
Waiver," FBI agents obtained permission from Crawford's parole
agent to go to Crawford's home and to search it.23 Although the FBI
hoped to find physical evidence of Crawford's involvement in the
robbery, they believed it unlikely that such evidence would be
discovered and hoped primarily for a confession from Crawford.24
For about an hour, the FBI searched Crawford's home and
questioned him about his involvement in the robbery, telling
Crawford that he was under investigatory detention, but not under
arrest. 25 After about an hour, no evidence had been uncovered, and
the FBI asked Crawford if he would be more comfortable talking
about the robbery at the FBI office.26  Crawford agreed and was
further questioned at the FBI.
27
A few hours later, Crawford admitted to his involvement in the
28bank robbery and was subsequently arrested. At trial Crawford
moved to suppress his confession, arguing that it was the product of
a search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.29  The district
20. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 725 (Trott, J., dissenting).
21. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 3056 (Deering 1992) ("Prisoners on parole
shall remain under the legal custody of the department and shall be subject at
any time to be taken back within the inclosure of the prison."); see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3053 (Deering Supp. 2003) ("The Board of Prison Terms upon
granting any parole to any prisoner may also impose on the parole any
conditions that it may deem proper.").
22. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 702.
23. Id. at 702-03.
24. Id. at 703.
25.Id.
26. Id. at 704.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 704-05.
29. Id. at 705.
Fall 2003]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
court denied the motion, and Crawford appealed.30 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the order and suppressed the confession,
holding that it was the product of an unconstitutional search.3'
B. The Majority's Approach
Reviewing de novo, the majority concluded that a search, to
satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements, must be reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances. 32 In examining the totality of the
circumstances, the majority first concluded that despite Crawford's
status as a parolee and despite his having signed documents
explaining his limited Fourth Amendment rights as a parolee,
Crawford had a reasonable, albeit "reduced," expectation of privacy
in his home.
33
After concluding that Crawford had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his home, the court balanced that expectation against the
government's need for intrusion.34 On balance, the court held that
Crawford's interest outweighed the state's.35  Relying heavily on
United States v. Knights,36 the court concluded that reasonable,
individualized suspicion of ongoing criminal activity is required for
parole searches despite any "Fourth Waiver" conditions.
37
Finally, the majority considered and discarded the argument that
Crawford consented in advance to waive his Fourth Amendment
rights, concluding that a person cannot voluntarily give consent when
30. Id.
31. Id. at 722-23. The resolution of Crawford remains to be seen, but the
Ninth Circuit recently granted rehearing en banc.
32. Id. at 705; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001)
(determining reasonableness by comparing privacy intrusion to government
interest in the intrusion); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)
(concluding that "reasonableness," under the Fourth Amendment, is
determined by "examining the totality of the circumstances."); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (stating that well-established principles
require reasonableness to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements).
33. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 710.
34.Id.
35. Id. at 715-16.
36. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
37. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 715-16.
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the alternative to such blanket consent is imprisonment. 38 Acknowl-
edging that an individual can ordinarily consent to a search, the
majority rejected, out of hand, the notion that a "Fourth Waiver" can
constitute valid advance consent to such a search.39
1II. ANALYSIS: THE CRAWFORD RESULT UNDER CURRENT
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The critical question in Crawford, as in any case where the
Fourth Amendment is invoked, is whether, given the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant had a reasonable and legitimate
expectation of privacy that outweighed the government's interest in
the intrusion. 40 The majority determined that Crawford's expectation
of privacy was both legitimate and reasonable and that the
government's interest was not sufficiently strong to outweigh that
privacy interest. 41  The dissent, in contrast, concluded that the
government's special need for supervision outweighed whatever
expectation Crawford may have had.42 Unfortunately for California,
the majority's conclusion was not simply a determination of
Crawford's rights, but also announced a new Fourth Amendment rule
that is now the law in the Ninth Circuit.
43
38. See id. at 718. The court did not state that any consent given in lieu
of prison is invalid. Id. Rather, it stated that the parole conditions cannot
constitute consent as presented when the alternative is to remain in prison
custody. Id. The majority followed the above analysis with a lengthy
discussion of whether Crawford's confession to law enforcement was
sufficiently attenuated from the wrongful search to cure the wrongfulness of
the search. Id. at 719. Neither the dissent nor this Comment finds that part of
the majority's opinion relevant. Id. at 725 (Trott, J., dissenting). Although the
discussion was necessary to wholly address the motion at issue in the case, it is
not necessary to discuss it here, as the relevant issues in the case arise long
before attenuation even hits the radar screen.
39. See id. at 718-19. The majority cited no U.S. Supreme Court
decision in which such consent has been rejected, instead relying on prior
Ninth Circuit disapproval of blanket waivers. Id.
40. See id. at 710; Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
41. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 715-17.
42. See id. at 737-38 (Trott, J., dissenting).
43. Furthermore, it has effectively invalidated California's current parole
conditions.
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A. Critique: Parolees'Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy
Defendants may invoke the Fourth Amendment only if they had
a subjective expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."' 44  Thus, determining a defendant's
expectation of privacy involves two considerations. First, the
expectation must be reasonable to society. Second, the defendant
must have had a subjective, actual expectation of privacy.
The majority erred in three respects in concluding that Crawford
had a reasonable and actual expectation of privacy in his home.
First, the majority granted Crawford a greater expectation of privacy
than the Supreme Court defined as reasonable for parolees in United
States v. Knights.45 Second, the majority's analysis of privacy in the
home for ordinary citizens does not compel an equally high
expectation of privacy for parolees. Finally, the majority in effect
ignored Crawford's outright admission that he had no subjective
expectation of privacy as a parolee and wrongly deferred to the trial
court in this respect.
1. Limited Expectations of Privacy Under
United States v. Knights
The Knights Court addressed to some extent the question of
whether society is prepared to accept that parolees have a reasonable
expectation of. privacy. The Supreme Court held in Knights that
probationers who sign conditions of release nearly identical to that
signed by Crawford have a "significantly diminished.. .expectation
of privacy."
47
Despite Knights 's holding that probationers have a "significantly
diminished ... expectation of privacy," the Crawford majority
characterized parolees' reasonable expectations of privacy as merely
"reduced., 48 As a result, upon balance against the state's interest in
conducting the search, the court concluded that Crawford's
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir.
2000).
45. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
46. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 707 n.13.
47. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120.
48. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 710.
[Vol. 37:23
UNITED STATES V CRA WFORD
expectation of privacy outweighed the government's interest in
intrusion. 49  Had the majority correctly identified the level of a
parolee's reasonable expectation, the balance would have plainly
given way to the government's special interest in parolee
supervision.
In Knights, the Supreme Court considered whether a "waiver"
50
of Fourth Amendment rights by a probationer 5 1 in California affected
a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy.52  Because
Knights, like Crawford, was "unambiguously informed" of the search
condition, the Court concluded that his expectation of privacy was
"significantly diminished. 53 Consequently, the government did not
bear a substantial burden in proving that its need to intrude
outweighed that "significantly diminished" expectation of privacy.
54
While at first blush this may appear to be an issue of pure semantics,
Crawford's subtle softening of the holding in Knights allowed the
court to increase parolees' reasonable expectations of privacy, thus
creating the need for a higher showing of cause by the government
and distorting the balance that should have been achieved. 55
The Crawford court, while acknowledging this characterization
in Knights, in fact applied a lesser variation of the expectation and
discussed Crawford's expectation as "reduced., 56 The Ninth Circuit's
reference to a "reduced" expectation of privacy simply cannot mean
the same thing as the message the Supreme Court delivered in
49. See id. at 715-16.
50. "Waiver" is contained in quotes because although the Supreme Court
referred to the conditions in California as a "waiver," there is still some
controversy concerning whether these types of conditions are really waivers at
all. See infra Part III.B.
51. The Ninth Circuit has held that for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, there is no relevant difference between "probation" and "parole."
United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). This Comment
accepts that holding without question.
52. Knights, 534 U.S. at 117-20.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 120-22 (discussing the important need of the state to
supervise and control its probationers as opposed to ordinary citizens).
55. Indeed, the Crawford majority engaged in distinguishing "reduced"
from "extinguished," a necessary and appropriate exercise to show the
different levels of reduction of an expectation that could be recognized by
society as reasonable. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 710.
56. Id.
Fall 2003]
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Knights that probationers and parolees only enjoy a bare minimum
expectation of privacy. Knights plainly outlined what level of
reasonable expectation parolees/probationers who have signed
conditions of release have, yet the Crawford court's analysis was
inconsistent with that level.57
2. The Crawford Result Under General Principles Regarding
Expectations of Privacy in the Home
The Crawford court also justified its decision by giving great
weight to the fact that Crawford was in his home at the time of the
search.58 It is true that the Supreme Court has identified the home as
an area in which privacy expectations for the ordinary citizen are
great.59 But the Supreme Court has also stated that while the place in
which a person has an expectation of privacy does play a part in the
consideration of that person's reasonable expectation, "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 60 Moreover, the fact that a
person is more likely to have an expectation of privacy in the home
does not necessarily imply that an individual has that subjective
expectation. Indeed, a parolee who is engaging in criminal activity is
most likely to expect to be searched in his or her home, imagining
that this would be the first place law enforcement would discover
criminal activity.
6 1
Aside from these doctrinal flaws in the analysis of privacy in the
home, the majority's discussion was merely an attempt to dismiss a
multitude of cases cited by the dissent in which far worse intrusions
than the one at issue in Crawford have been upheld despite Fourth
Amendment considerations, when the government's special needs
57. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20 (a probationer who was "unambiguously
informed" of the conditions of his parole had a "significantly
diminished.. .reasonable expectation of privacy."). In fact, Knights's
expectation may have been completely extinguished, but the Court declined to
address that possibility. Id. at 120 n.6.
58. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 706-08, 710.
59. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
60. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Crawford,
323 F.3d at 735-36 (Trott, J., dissenting) (arguing that Crawford's presence in
his home at the time of the parole search did not justify the majority's analysis
of the special needs doctrine).
61. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 ("probationers have even more of an
incentive to conceal their criminal activities").
[Vol. 37:23
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take precedence. 62 Surely if schools can constitutionally take bodily
fluids from high school students in an effort to discover drug use of
which no suspicion exists, then law enforcement may search the
home of a convicted parolee who no longer "enjoy[s] a presumption
of innocence ' 63 when reliable information reveals that he may have
been involved in additional, undiscovered crimes.
64
To conclude that because the searches cited by the Crawford
dissent did not occur in the home they have no bearing on
Crawford's search of his home is entirely misplaced. The body is the
single most expected area of privacy, equal to, if not above and
beyond that of the home.65  Indeed, the Fourth Amendment
enumerates not only the home, but also the person, yet the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the body, like the home, may be
searched without a warrant without offending the Fourth Amendment
when the need for the intrusion sufficiently outweighs the privacy
expectation. 66 Nevertheless, the majority insisted that these bodily
searches were distinguishable because they did not occur in the
home, while parole searches conducted to discover past criminal
activity, with the permission of parole officers, after the signing of a
"Fourth Waiver" are not permissible67 because they do occur in the
home. 68 There is no palpable logic to this distinction-it merely
attempts to deflect the real issue of the A ovemmental need for
intrusion into the private lives of individuals.
The location of the search is one of many germane
circumstances to be considered, yet the Crawford majority treated it
62. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 735 (Trott, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 732 (Trott, J., dissenting); see also Latta v. Fitzharris, 521
F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835 (2002).
65. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 735-36 (Trott, J., dissenting).
66. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989);
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Bd. of
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
67. (without reasonable, individual suspicion of ongoing criminal
activity).
68. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 706-08, 710.
69. Moreover, the people searched in these types of cases still enjoyed the
presumption of innocence no longer a luxury to parolees and probationers. See
id. at 732 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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as nearly dispositive.70 No one disputes that Crawford could have
some level of expectation in his home, but the majority's focus on
this fact was far too narrow. It necessarily implied that a parolee's
expectation of privacy in the home was the same as that of the
ordinary citizen. This proposition is contrary to the nature of a
parolee's status as an individual who is under constant supervision of
the California Department of Corrections. 71
3. Review of Crawford's Actual
Expectation of Privacy
Factually, Crawford could not have had more than a minimal
subjective expectation of privacy. Because Crawford's subjective
expectation of privacy was a factual determination to be made by the
trial court, the majority concluded that they should grant great
deference to the trial court's conclusion that Crawford did have an
expectation of privacy.
72
While the majority had the standard of review right, the
application of it was lacking. Even under this highly deferential
standard of review, one need only look at Crawford's own admission
to see that Crawford had almost no, if absolutely no expectation of
privacy: "'I mean, I just, you know, took for granted that, you know,
I'm on parole, that I don't have no rights at all. 73 While society may
to some degree regret this mistaken belief of an absolute lack of
rights, clearly Crawford held an unequivocal belief that he had no
Fourth Amendment rights at all.74 Crawford's mistaken belief makes
it no less a belief. Combine this statement with Crawford's initials
by the conditions of his parole in his "Fourth Waiver," and what
other conclusions may be drawn? Rather than confront these two
70. See id. at 706-08.
71. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3056 (Deering 1992).
72. See id. at 707 n.13.
73. Id.
74. It bears mention that Crawford, of course, was wrong. Never will the
Supreme Court allow a parolee to lose all of his or her constitutional rights.
See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered. A Legal
Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2011, 2011 (2000) ("defendant may waive most, though not all, of his
fundamental constitutional and statutory rights."). The issue here is not the
existence of Crawford's rights under the Fourth Amendment, but the extent of
those rights. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 707 n.13.
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glaring facts, the majority simply brushed them aside as
insignificant-citing Crawford's statement of surprise when FBI
agents entered his home as grounds for the trial court's
determination.75
However, an examination of the facts determined in the trial
court demonstrates that the facts did not support the court's
conclusion. There were essentially three facts established in the trial
court: (1) Crawford's statement that he believed he had no rights;
76
(2) his signature by the conditions of parole allowing search at any
time for no reason at all; 77 and (3) his shock when agents entered his
home one night.78  The first two factors work clearly against
Crawford. Even the third factor does not support his argument
because Crawford may have been shocked that law enforcement
officers tracked him down; however, that does not necessarily mean
that he was shocked that his home could be searched while he was on
parole. Accordingly, as the Crawford dissent argued, Crawford had
virtually no actual, subjective expectation of privacy.79
B. Fourth Waivers as Valid Consent
It is unclear whether conditions such as those at issue in
Crawford should be viewed as valid consent. 8 Consequently, there
was serious dispute between the Crawford majority and the dissent
as to whether the "Fourth Waiver" is really a waiver and as to
whether it can constitute consent to searches otherwise in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. This difficult issue did not need to be
decided in Crawford.
75. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 707 n.13.
76.Id.
77. Id; id. at 725-26 (Trott, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 707 n. 13.
79. Id. at 727 (Trott, J., dissenting). Perhaps Crawford had a minimal
expectation of privacy, but whatever the minimal level he may have had, the
bottom line is that the government should not have had to prove more than a
minimal showing of need for intrusion.
80. The doctrine of criminal waiver is controversial. Thus, it is no
surprise that the majority and dissent disagreed on the subject. See Crawford,
323 F.3d at 717-19, 725.
81. Compare Crawford, 323 F.3d at 717-19 (majority's discussion of
whether "Fourth Waivers" can constitute valid consent), with id. at 725 (Trott,
J., dissenting) (concluding that consent/waiver is irrelevant).
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It is axiomatic that people may consent to searches that would
otherwise violate their Fourth Amendment rights.8 2  A ,lication of
this basic principle to "Fourth Waivers" is controversial. The
dissent argued that "Fourth Waivers" are not waivers at all; rather,
they are conditions of parole to which all parolees are subject, and
accordingly the dissent did not address the issue of consent at all.84
In contrast, the majority discussed for pages whether Crawford's
signature on the "Fourth Waiver" constituted valid, voluntary
consent. 85 As a practical matter, whether one takes the view of the
majority-that the "waiver" was not valid because it was not made
voluntarily, 86 or the position of the dissent-arguing that the
"waiver" is no waiver at all, but a condition not subject to consent,
the search in Crawford should have been permitted. Either way,
Crawford had a substantially diminished, if not extinguished
expectation of privacy that could not outweigh law enforcement's
legitimate interests. Accordingly, the government should have been
required only to show a minimal need for intrusion and minimal
cause for doing so. In Crawford's case, there were adequate
circumstances for allowing the search, but the court's analysis of
consent, special needs, and expectations of privacy went beyond that
was necessary.
C. California's Special Need for Supervision
of Parolees
The majority's insistence that the Supreme Court's holding in
Knights only slightly reduced a parolee/probationer privacy
expectation allowed the majority to quickly dismiss California's need
for the supervision of its parolees. As such, the Crawford, court
82. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (holding that
Fourth Amendment rights may be waived voluntarily by consent); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see also United States v.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995) (criminal defendants "may knowingly
and voluntarily waive many of the most fundamental protections afforded by
the Constitution").
83. See generally William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal
Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989) (discussing the doctrine of criminal
waiver and its ambiguities).
84. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 725.
85. See id. at 717-19.
86. Id.
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repeatedly cited the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution as the reason
for ignoring California's special needs. But the Constitution, as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, does not conflict with the
California law at issue. 7
The Supreme Court developed the special needs doctrine in
order to recognize that in certain cases, the ordinary requirements of
the Fourth Amendment are impractical and unadvisable. In some
limited circumstances, individualized suspicion is not required.89 In
the context of searches, if the expectation of privacy is not great
enough to overcome the government's special need, then the search
is constitutional.
90
California's need to supervise its parolees is abundantly clear
when one looks at a few simple statistics. California currently has
approximately 161,000 incarcerated individuals. 91 Of these inmates,
most serve determinate sentences, making them eligible for parole
after serving, on average, between fifty and sixty percent of their
sentences, with no input from a parole board.92  In the last decade,
due in part to this non-discretionary system of release, California has
seen a more than seventy percent increase in the number of prisoners
released on parole.93  In fact, almost ninety-eight percent of
California's prisoners are placed on parole.94  Of those released on
87. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22.
88. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding the
constitutionality of a high school's suspicionless drug testing policy); Nat'l
Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (upholding
the constitutionality of the U.S. Custom Service's suspicionless drug testing of
its employees).
89. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 829.
90. See Nat'l Treas. Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 668.
91. Paige M. Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2002 3,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pu.PDF (Apr. 2003).
92. Timothy A. Hughes et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Trends in State
Parole, 1990-2000, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pu.PDF (Oct. 2001); see also
Joan Petersilia, Parole in California: Is This a Version of the Future in
Queensland?, at http://www.angelfire.com/space/pls/Docs/InsideOut_2/
Califomiaparolearticle.htm (Sept. 2000) (discussing the mandatory, non-
discretionary system of parole in California).
93. See Hughes et al., supra note 92, at 3.
94. Jeremy Travis & Sarah Lawrence, Urban Institute, Beyond the Prison
Gates: The State of Parole in America 14 (Nov. 2002), at http://
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parole in California, less than twenty-five percent successfully
complete their supervision period-almost twenty percent less than
the national average. 95 In fact, when California is excluded from the
national rates, the national parole success rates increase on average
about ten to fifteen percent.96  What is most alarming (and most
relevant to the discussion of California's critical need for parolee
supervision) is that recent statistics show that California has the
highest recidivism rate of any state.
97
Recognizing California's crisis in recidivism, supervision, and
crime,98 the Supreme Court stated in Knights that in ignoring the
need for adequate supervision in California, "the Court of Appeals
... would require the State to shut its eyes to the [special need] and
concentrate only on [reintegration]. But we hold that the Fourth
Amendment does not put the State to such a choice."99  The Knights
court further pointed out:
[P]robationers have even more of an incentive to conceal
their criminal activities and quickly dispose of
incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because
probationers are aware that they may be subject to
supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible
incarceration... in which the trial rights of a jury and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, do not
apply. 100
Consequently, the Knights court held that probationers °'0 do not
enjoy the same level of Fourth Amendment privilege as ordinary
www.urban.orgfUploadedPDF/310583_Beyondprisongates.pdf; see also
Petersilia, supra note 92.
95. See Travis & Lawrence, supra note 94, at 11.
96. Id. at 19; Hughes et al., supra note 94, at 12.
97. Turley, supra note 13, at B11.
98. Obviously, the above statistics may be interpreted in various ways.
But the irrefutable conclusion is that California's many criminals, after release,
commit more crimes and thus require more supervision.
99. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (emphasis
added). The Knights court did not explicitly refer to supervision as a "special
need," instead evaluating it as the government's side of the balance in
examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 120.
100. Id. at 120.
101. And thus parolees.
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citizens. °2 Indeed, the above statistics clearly illustrate the state's
critical need for supervision. The Crawford court failed to come to
grips with this special need, holding it to be less significant than
Crawford's possible expectation that he would not be searched. The
prudent approach, given this clear balance in favor of the
government's need, would have been to require only the most
minimal showing that the parole search was being conducted for
legitimate law enforcement purposes.
Given this approach, the concept of special needs discussed in
this Comment would not allow law enforcement to search with no
cause, but rather would allow for investigation with minimal
showing of cause. In a case such as Crawford, where there was a
signed waiver, valid parole conditions allowing for searches, an
admission that the parolee had a minimal to no subjective
expectation of privacy, and a legitimate robbery investigation for
which the parolee was a suspect, no further showing of government
need should be required.
D. Balancing Need with Expectation: What Level of Suspicion
Should Be Required
After concluding that Crawford had an objectively reasonable,
subjectively legitimate expectation of privacy in his home, the
Crawford majority concluded that this expectation outweighed
California's need to supervise its hundreds of thousands of parolees,
many of whom, like Crawford, are repeat offenders. 10 3 The balance
should have gone in the other direction.
Ninth Circuit law now requires law enforcement personnel to
have a reasonable, individualized suspicion that the parolee is
engaging in ongoing criminal activity to search a parolee, regardless
of the conditions of parole. Amazingly, it relies on Knights for this
conclusion. °4 But the Knights court never held that law enforcement
could not constitutionally search a parolee subject to parole
conditions allowing a search at any time, without reasonable
102. Id. at 121.
103. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 716; see also Travis & Lawrence, supra note
94, at 22.
104. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 705-06.
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suspicion of ongoing criminal activity.10 5  The Knights court only
went so far as to hold that when individualized suspicion exists, the
balance weighs in favor of the search. 10 6 The Knights court did not
hold that individualized suspicion of continuing criminal activity is
required. Thus, the Court has yet to draw any lines as to how far a
state's special needs must extend before the balance tips in favor of
an individual's expectation of privacy. The Crawford court, while
acknowledging this holding, extended it to the assumption that such
suspicion is required. 10 7  In fact, the Knights court rejected such
extensions, stating that "dubious logic... [is required to assert] that an
opinion upholding the constitutionality of a particular search
implicitly holds unconstitutional any search that is not like it."
10 8
Furthermore, the Crawford rule is a step in the wrong direction and
draws Fourth Amendment lines that leave law enforcement without
adequate means of supervising state wards.
The concern over continuing limitation of parolee rights cannot,
as a matter of common sense, extend to investigation of crime such
as that in Crawford. A few simple hypotheticals illustrate the proper
application of the Fourth Amendment in searches of parolees and
their residences. When it comes to parolees, there are a range of
intrusions that law enforcement could seek to justify. For example,
could the state install video cameras in parolees' homes, without a
warrant, to conduct twenty-four hour surveillance with no cause
whatsoever? Clearly, this type of activity would not be justified
under Knights. Likewise, it would be an unjustified intrusion for law
enforcement to enter a parolees' place of work regularly to search her
pockets for drugs in front of her coworkers with no suspicion that she
possessed any, especially if she had not been previously convicted of
any drug offense. In other words, Knights and proper application of
105. Because the Court found that the search in Knights was supported by
reasonable suspicion, the Court expressly declined to address whether a
suspicionless search could be conducted pursuant to a Fourth Waiver. Knights,
534 U.S. at 120 n.6.
106. Id. at 121.
107. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 715-16.
108. Knights, 534 U.S. at 117.
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the special needs doctrine would prohibit law enforcement from
arbitrarily harassing a parolee for no reason at all. 10 9
However, nothing in Knights prohibits law enforcement from
searching a parolee's vehicle without a warrant after receiving
reliable evidence that weapons are inside. In fact, Knights would
seem to expressly authorize such action." 0 Recognizing the need to
balance enforcement with legitimate Fourth Amendment rights, the
Knights Court held that law enforcement does not need a warrant to
search a person on parole or probation.' l1 But Knights did not go so
far as to say what is required. Again, Knights simply extended the
Fourth Amendment line to allow Fourth Amendment searches
supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; it declined to
answer how far that line would extend. 112
The circumstances of Crawford lie between the twenty-four
hour surveillance extreme and the reliable information of possession
of weapons extreme. While there was no concrete evidence that
Crawford was still engaging in criminal activity, the FBI had reliable
information that Crawford had been involved in the prior robbery
and the search was for legitimate law enforcement purposes. 13  The
Supreme Court has never ruled that this is insufficient to support a
reasonable search under the state's special needs doctrine, and it is
unnecessary to do so. To say that Crawford's "expectation of
privacy" in his home, 1 4 after being told unequivocally that he could
be searched at any time, somehow outweighs the State's need to
supervise those people who have been convicted of crimes and are
still serving their sentences 1 5 is a gross departure from the lessons of
109. To this end, California adopted the standard that a parole search may
not be "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing." People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743,
752 (1998); 968 P.2d 445, 450; 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 739. As illustrated by
this Comment, nothing in the Constitution forbids this standard. See Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
110. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22.
111. Id. at 121.
112. Id. at 121-22.
113. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 724 (Trott, J., dissenting).
114. For a discussion of Crawford's subjective expectation of privacy, see
supra at Part III.A and accompanying footnotes.
115. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3056 (Deering 1992) ("Prisoners on parole
shall remain under the legal custody of the department and shall be subject at
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Knights. True, at some point on the continuum, Fourth Amendment
considerations must win out. 116 But the Crawford court has drawn
the wrong line on the continuum and has unnecessarily left
California's law enforcement with far less ability to adequately
supervise its parolees."i
7
IV. CONCLUSION
The practical result of United States v. Crawford has yet to be
seen. 118 If allowed to stand on rehearing, it will certainly force
California to seriously rethink how and when to release prisoners
under the sole supervision of parole agents.
The most prudent approach, and the approach most consistent
with current Supreme Court doctrine, is to permit law enforcement to
conduct searches of a parolee's home if they can make a minimal
showing that the search is for legitimate law enforcement purposes119
and not a mere ruse for interfering with a parolee's privacy. This
approach could be adopted under the special needs doctrine. It
would also avoid the difficult and undecided issue of whether the
parolee's advance agreement to be searched can constitute a valid
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Finally, it is an approach that
does not give a green light to law enforcement to harass parolees or
interfere with their reintegration into society but does give law
any time to be taken back within the inclosure of the prison."). This is
somewhat different from other state systems.
116. California perhaps drew the correct line on the continuum, now ruled
unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit-Fourth Amendment considerations
prevail over searches that are arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. People v.
Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743 (1998).
117. See Crawford, 323 F.3d at 736-37 (Trott, J., dissenting).
118. Although the California Supreme Court recently expressed its
disagreement with the holding of Crawford. See People v. Sanders, No.
S094088, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 5371, at *9 (Cal. July 31, 2003) (noting the Reyes
holding and expressing disagreement with the holding in Crawford as contrary
to Reyes); see also Levenson, supra note 10, at 7.
119. Whether for past or presently occurring criminal activity.
120. See Levenson, supra note 10 (stating that Supreme Court
jurisprudence before Crawford allowed greater latitude to law enforcement
searches of parolees).
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enforcement sufficient authority to ensure that parolees remain in
compliance with the law.
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